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Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence of advantageous selection in insurance markets. By using a novel insurance
setting where moral hazard is not a concern, I am able to overcome an important obstacle in most studies of selection:
the inability to distinguish moral hazard from selection. In the US market for area yield crop insurance, payouts are
based on average county yields. Moreover, area yield insurance is only offered in counties where no farmer is large
enough to affect the mean yield. I find that area yield insurance takeup is higher when average yields in the county
are higher and show that this effect is not being driven by prices. This suggests that the net selection into these plans
thus favors insurance providers, not buyers. One possible mechanism is that providers have better information about
aggregate yields. Another is that the desirability of other, non-area yield, insurance options changes, a potentially
important but previously overlooked driver of selection.
Keywords: insurance, selection, crop insurance
1. Introduction
The extent to which selection occurs in insurance markets has long been an important empirical question. Tra-
ditionally, the focus has been on "adverse" selection, in which higher-risk individuals have more coverage. Adverse
selection can lead to large welfare losses and is one of the main economic justifications for mandating insurance cov-
erage. More recently, it has been recognized that, in certain cases, selection may be "advantageous," that is, favoring
providers. In this case, lower-risk individuals have more coverage. Advantageous selection can arise when individuals
who are more risk averse both buy more comprehensive insurance and take more precautions (de Meza and Webb,
2001; De Donder and Hindriks, 2009). Advantageous selection may also be the result of informational asymmetries
that favor providers. When the relationships between characteristics and risk are complex, insurers may have an infor-
mational advantage over buyers. Specifically, insurers may have better information about the average risk associated
with a particular characteristic. The presence of asymmetric information favoring insurers may undo some or all of
the effect of asymmetric information that benefits buyers (Seog, 2009; Villeneuve, 2000, 2005).
Testing for selection in markets such as health and auto insurance is complicated by the presence of moral hazard.
These two effects can lead to similar patterns in the data, but they have very different welfare and public policy
implications. In this paper, I test for selection in a novel setting where moral hazard is not a concern: area yield plans
in the US crop insurance market. Indemnity payments in area yield plans are based on the average yield in a given
county and not on individual yields, removing moral hazard concerns. Thus, these plans provide a cleaner test of
selection than is possible in other insurance markets.
First, following Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) and Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), I test for selection on public
information that affects outcomes but is not reflected in the price. Specifically, I show that yields are autocorrelated but
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area yield premiums do not account for this because of a lag in official data availability. Therefore, recent yields are
informative about future yields and should affect farmers’ insurance decisions. Thus, the first test consists of checking
whether last year’s yield affects the total demand for group insurance. Because average county yields should be easily
observable, I expect this information to favor farmers.
The second test I develop does not require explicitly specifying the information on which farmers or providers
select. In addition to last year’s yield, farmers or insurers may have other information about future yields that is not
reflected in prices. Even though this information may not be observable to the econometrician, its presence should lead
to a correlation between contemporaneous yields and takeup, after controlling for other insurance choice determinants.
Three features of group insurance make it possible to attribute any residual correlation between the current yield and
takeup to selection rather than to price changes or moral hazard. First, the pricing formula for group insurance plans is
known and, as I show, does not reflect contemporaneous yields. Second, because group insurance is typically offered
in counties that have many farmers, there is no potential for moral hazard. Finally, the insurance decision is made
before crops are planted (and thus before yields are known). Thus, this "reduced-form" test for selection consists of
testing whether the number of group insurance policies is significantly correlated with the current yield.
I find some evidence that last year’s yield affects takeup of group insurance plans in corn but not soybeans, although
estimates of the latter are not very precise. As expected, selection based on last year’s yield favors farmers. The second
(reduced-form) test indicates that group insurance takeup is higher when average current yields in a county are higher.
This suggests that, even though there is some adverse selection, the net selection into area yield plans favors providers,
not buyers of insurance.
Finally, I show that last year’s yields are also predictive of the total number of insurance policies in the county,
including area yield plans and non-area yield plans. This suggests that the desirability of other plans may be changing
with yields as well, affecting other options in farmers’ choice sets. Changes in the outside option (relative to the
plan being considered) is another potential driver of selection that has been previously overlooked. However, because
prices in non-group plans are determined using an individual’s yield history, which I do not observe, I cannot determine
whether the relationship between aggregate takeup of insurance and yield is due to selection, changes in prices, or both.
In addition to being informative about selection more generally, looking at selection in the crop insurance market
is important in its own right. Despite a long-run decrease in developed countries’ vulnerability to weather shocks,
agriculture worldwide remains susceptible to weather fluctuations. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), climate change will increase the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and
change their spatial distribution (Meehl et al., 2007; Schneider et al., 2007). This is estimated to be costly to the
agricultural sector (Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007). Yield variability and the variance of food prices are likely to
increase, at least in the short run. A functioning insurance market may be key to keeping the agricultural sector stable,
especially in developing countries. Because of low implementation costs, area yield or weather-based insurance is
thought to be the most efficient way to provide crop insurance in many developing countries. This makes studying
this particular type of insurance important. For example if there is advantageous selection that is not driven by risk
preferences, the gains from having this type of insurance may be eroded.
I contribute to two bodies of literature. First, I contribute to the extensive body of literature testing for adverse
selection in various insurance markets. These include health insurance (e.g., Cutler and Reber, 1998; Fang et al., 2008;
Einav et al., 2011; Handel, 2011), long-term care insurance (e.g., Sloan and Norton, 1997; Finkelstein and McGarry,
2006; Brown and Finkelstein, 2007), annuities (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002, 2004; Fong, 2002; McCarthy and
Mitchell, 2010), nursing home use (Gruber and Grabowski, 2007), auto insurance (e.g., Chiappori and Salanie, 2000;
Cohen, 2005; Chiappori et al., 2006), life insurance (Cawley and Philipson, 1999; He, 2009), and credit cards (Agarwal
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et al., 2010).1 The overwhelming takeaway from this literature is that the extent of selection varies significantly and
findings from one market may not generalize to another market. Given the importance of the crop insurance market,
both currently and in the future, testing for selection in this market is well worth the effort. Moreover, the absence of
moral hazard in the plans that I am considering makes this a particularly clean test of selection.
I also contribute to the literature on crop insurance by performing the first test of selection in area yield insurance
plans. Although there have been numerous studies of moral hazard and adverse selection in crop insurance, these
have typically examined the correlation between farmer characteristics and crop insurance decisions (e.g., Makki and
Somwaru, 2001) or focused on a narrow geographical area (Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Horowitz and Lichtenberg,
1993; Coble et al., 1997; Roberts et al., 2006). Several program-wide tests have been performed (e.g., Walters et al.,
2007), but to the best of my knowledge, this is the first test to use unpriced public information as the cause of selection
and to look at selection in area yield plans.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical setting and the data. In Section
3, I discuss the empirical framework used to test for selection and moral hazard. Section 4 presents the results, and
Section 5 discusses and concludes.
2. The Empirical Setting
2.1. The US Crop Insurance Market
Crop insurance plans in the US differ with respect to the insured crop, the metric that determines payment, and the
level of the deductible, called the "coverage level." Payments can be determined by (a) individual yield, (b) individual
revenue, (c) mean county yield or (d) mean county revenue. Farmers cannot take out multiple insurance plans for the
same plot. Within these plan types, farmers can choose from several coverage levels ranging from 50% to 90%.2 The
coverage level specifies the amount by which yield or revenue has to fall (relative to a baseline) before any payment is
made. If a farmer chooses a 75% coverage level, for example, he does not receive payments until his yield, revenue, the
county yield, or the county revenue (depending on the type of plan) falls more than 25% below the established baseline.
The plan type and coverage level largely describe the space of all insurance plans available to farmers planting a given
crop.3 In this section, I describe the area yield plans. Individual yield, individual revenue, and county revenue plans
are discussed briefly in Appendix A.
An area yield plan, called a "Group Risk Plan" (GRP) in the US, is based on the extent to which current average
county yields deviate from an historic average or "baseline." Baseline county yields, also referred to as the expected
yield, are based on at least 30 years of yield history and are trend-adjusted to reflect long-run productivity changes.4
Per-acre payments in GRP are determined as follows:
Pay_GRPit = max
(
0,
[
Yield guaranteeict − Yieldct
]
× price electioni
)
(1)
Yield guaranteeict = Xi ∗
1
T
T+1∑
s=2
Ŷieldc,t−s
where T > 29, i indexes the farmer, t indexes the year, and Xi is the chosen coverage level. For group yield plans, per
acre payments range from 60% to 90%, in five percentage-point increments. Ŷieldc,t−s is the de-trended average county
1For a broad overview of the evidence for adverse selection in various insurance markets, see Cohen and Siegelman (2010).
2The exact range depends on the plan type.
3Farmers also have some choices within a plan-coverage-level combination, such as how to combine different plots and how much to get paid
in the case of a shortfall. For a more comprehensive overview of the US crop insurance market, see Babcock (2011).
4Data on yield histories used to establish county yields are provided by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS).
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yield. In practice, the calculation of the expected yield, 1T
∑T+1
s=2 Ŷieldc,t−s, is more complicated than appears here, as
weighted neighboring county yields are used as well. Moreover, a subjective adjustment may be made in some cases.
Note that past yields are incorporated into the expected yield (and subsequently into prices) with a lag. This is because
NASS releases county yield estimates for the previous year several months after GRP prices and expected yields for
the upcoming year have to be set. The presence of this lag potentially creates useful yet unpriced information that
insurance providers or farmers can exploit. In the following sections, I estimate both whether lagged yields provide
useful information and whether they are subsequently exploited by the buyers or sellers of insurance.
Payments under area yield plans are made if county yields fall far enough below the yield guarantee. Price election
is the payment per unit of yield shortfall, chosen by the farmer from a fixed range. For example, a corn farmer with a
yield guarantee of 148 bushels per acre, a 75% coverage level, and a $1.50 price election will get paid $1.50 for every
unit shortfall in yield below 111 bushels per acre. Prices for area yield plans are determined based on parametrically
modeling the yield distribution in a particular area (see Skees et al., 1997, for details).
To reduce the level of moral hazard and adverse selection, farmers are required to initiate the purchase of insurance
by a certain date, called the "sales closing date." This date varies by county, crop, and year and precedes the earliest
allowed planting date.5 In all cases, insurance decisions are made months before yields for that year are realized. In
addition, to ensure that farmers are not "gambling" on yields, they must plant the relevant crop in order to participate
in the area yield plan.
2.2. Insurance Choice
A farmer will choose the insurance plan that maximizes expected utility. Ignoring risk aversion, the utility of an
insurance plan is negatively related to its price and positively related to the expected indemnity payment. The expected
indemnity payment, in turn, has two key components: the baseline yield and the actual yield. A higher baseline yield,
all else equal, increases the expected payout by making it more likely that the actual yield will be sufficiently below
the baseline. A higher actual yield, on the other hand, decreases the payout.
Because there is uncertainty about future yields, informational asymmetries can arise in this market. In particular,
there is potential for adverse selection based on private information about likely county yields or on public information
that isn’t priced into the insurance plan (e.g., forecasted weather conditions). This may lead to adverse or advantageous
selection and undermine the functioning of the market.
Both the baseline (or expected) yield and prices are set by the Risk Management Agency every year. I therefore
exploit the variation in information about the actual yield to test for selection in and out of area yield insurance plans.
2.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
My data come from three datasets: the Summary of Business Reports, FCI-35 actuarial information, and GRP
Final Payment Yields. All are published by the Risk Management Agency (RMA).6 All data are annual, cover the
years 1995-2009, and are broken down by county, crop, insurance plan type, and coverage level. The Summary
of Business Reports includes information about the number of insurance policies purchased. The FCI-35 dataset
provides information about plan availability and pricing. The GRP Final Payment Yields dataset contains actual yields
and expected ("baseline") yields, as computed by the RMA.
Because prices and the overall attractiveness of individual plans vary with individual yield histories while the
available data provide only plan-by-coverage-level summaries, testing for selection into individual insurance plans is
5In some circumstances, a farmer may purchase insurance after the sales closing date, but these circumstances are limited.
6Available from http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/sob/scc/index.html, ftp://ftp.rma.usda.gov/pub/Publications/FCI-35/, and
http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/grpfinal/, respectively.
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not feasible. Therefore, I focus on area yield insurance plans (GRP), for which all the relevant pricing information is
observable. In addition, group plans do not create the risk of moral hazard, making this purely a test of selection. I
focus on corn and soybeans because these are the most commonly grown crops and thus have the largest number of
relevant observations. I perform the analysis separately for each crop.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the key variables used in the analysis, including yields, number of group
insurance policies, and the total number of insurance policies. Columns 1 and 2 show the mean and standard deviations
for corn and soybeans, respectively. The average number of insurance policies is similar for corn (169 policies) and
soybeans (179 policies). GRPs are available in 1,076 counties for corn and 961 counties for soybeans at least once
during the time period of interest. GRP plans represent, on average, about 2-3% of all insurance policies. Thus,
they are fairly unpopular. A likely explanation for this is that individual plans offer more individually tailored risk
protection and generally have higher indemnity payment-to-premium ratios.
To motivate the formal analysis, I begin by illustrating the raw relationships between actual, expected, and last
year’s yields. Figure 1 shows the relationship between actual and expected yields for corn and soybeans. Although
there is a substantial amount of variance, the two are strongly and positively related for both crops. However, a fitted
quadratic relationship lies above the 45 degree line for corn, indicating that expected yields are generally below actual
yields. For soybeans, the fitted line is somewhat flatter than the 45 degree line, but does cross it. Overall, the expected
yield is most biased at high and low yields, but the magnitude does not appear to be large. I later re-examine this
relationship taking fixed effects into account.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between actual yield and last year’s yield for the two crops. Again, the two are
strongly and positively related. The plots for soybeans and corn look very similar. A quadratic fit line indicates that
low (high) yields last year are indicative of higher (lower) yields this year. This is true for both crops and suggests that
there is some mean reversion in yields. If this is not accounted for in the price, there is potential for exploiting this
information.
3. Empirical Framework
3.1. Selection on last year’s yield
To test for the presence of adverse selection, I follow Finkelstein and McGarry (2006). Specifically, I estimate the
following equations:
Log(Yieldct) = β1Log(Yieldc,t−1) + β2Log(Et−1 [Yieldct]) + αt + αc + εct (2)
Policiesct = γ1Log(Yieldc,t−1) + γ2Log(Et−1 [Yieldct]) + αt + αc + εct (3)
where c is the county and t is the year. Et−1 [Yieldct] is the expected corn or soybean yield in county c and year t, as
reported by the RMA prior to the start of the growing season. Yieldc,t−1 is the yield in the previous year, also reported
by RMA. Policiesct is the number of corn GRP policies held. αt and αc are year and county fixed effects, respectively.
The specification for equation (2) is OLS, while the specification for equation (3) is negative binomial. Standard errors
are clustered by state-year in this and all following specifications.7
Equation (2) tests whether last year’s yield is predictive of current yield. I control for the expected yield because it
is used to set the price of the insurance policies as well as to determine the yield guarantee. As I explain in Section 2,
last year’s yield is not used to determine either the expected yield or the price of GRPs. I later confirm that last year’s
7Clustering by county generally decreases the standard errors.
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yield is not reflected in prices empirically. Therefore, if β1 is significantly different from 0, then there is potential for
selection into the GRP plans.
Equation (3) tests for the presence of such adverse selection. In particular, I estimate whether last year’s yield
affects the number of policies chosen, conditional on the expected yield. The coefficient of interest is thus γ1. Depend-
ing on the relationship between the current yield and last year’s yield, it may be positive or negative. All else equal,
farmers have an incentive to take out insurance if they know that yields will be lower than the insurance company
expects it to be. Thus, if β1 is positive (negative), γ1 should be negative (positive) when adverse selection is present.
3.2. Reduced-form test of selection
There is another test of selection that can be performed in this setting because of three specific features of area
yield insurance in the US. First, there is no moral hazard in these plans because they are based on the average county
yield and are available only in counties with many farms. Second, the insurance choice in a given year is made months
before yields in that year are realized. Finally, as I show in Appendix B, contemporaneous yields and prices are not
correlated.
Suppose there is some information accessible to farmers or providers (e.g., weather forecasts or changes in soil
quality) that is not reflected in the price but is predictive of yield in the upcoming season. If buyers or providers act
on this information, there should be a significant relationship between current yields and the number of policies, even
though current yields are not known when the insurance decisions are made. To test for this, I estimate the relationship
between the current yield and the number of GRP policies, controlling for the expected yield:
Policiesct = θ1Log(Yieldct) + θ2Log(Et−1 [Yieldct]) + αt + αc + εct (4)
Instead of looking at selection on past observable information, this specification tests for selection on future yield
realizations, controlling for the expected yield. Because farmers must purchase insurance long before the current yield
is known, θ1 implicitly captures the effect of other (unpriced) information that farmers or providers may have about
yield realizations without having to measure this information explicitly.
3.3. Prices
Finally, I test whether or not prices (as reported in FCI-35 actuarial files) are affected directly by last year’s yield
or the current yield:
Log
(
Pgct
)
= β1Log(Yieldc,t−1) + β2Log(Et−1 [Yieldct]) + αgt + αgc + εgct (5)
Log
(
Pgct
)
= δ1Log(Yieldct) + δ2Log(Et−1 [Yieldct]) + αgt + αgc + εgct (6)
g = coverage level; t = year; c = county
I perform this test at the coverage level, a more disaggregated level than is involved in the adverse selection test, for
the following reason: If the relative proportion of people at each coverage level changes because of adverse selection,
the average price across coverage levels might be statistically but not causally related to last year’s yields. I use the
unsubsidized prices set by the insurance providers. Because premium subsidy rates vary only across years and not
across counties, this does not affect the results. The results of this regression are shown in Tables A1 and A2 and
confirm that last year’s yields and current yields are unrelated to GRP prices.
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4. Results
Table 2 shows the relationship between last year’s yield and the current yield for each crop, controlling for expected
yield, county fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 have the log of the current yield as the dependent
variable, while Columns 3 and 4 have the level of the current yield as the dependent variable. The full sample includes
all counties in which GRP plans are available at some point during 1995-2009. In Columns 2 and 4, I restrict the
sample to counties in which GRP policies are taken up at all during the sample period. The results are similar in both
samples. Panel A shows these results for corn. There is no significant relationship between this year’s yield and last
year’s yield in levels and a very weak one between the levels of this year’s yield and the expected yield. For soybeans
(Panel B), a one-unit increase in yields in a given year is associated with a 0.08-0.09-unit decrease in yields the next
year, and this relationship is statistically significant. The relationship between the logs of the yield and the lagged
yield is strong and significant for both crops.
According to Columns 1 and 2, a 1% increase in corn yields is associated with a 0.09−0.12% decrease in yields in
the following year, holding expected yield constant. Thus, yields appear to exhibit some mean reversion. This process
is not necessarily random: The lower yields following higher yields may be due to patterns of nutrient depletion in the
soil or of crop rotation. The expected yield is also negatively correlated with the actual yield: A 1% increase in the
expected yield is associated with a 0.32 − 0.38% reduction in the actual yield. This is conditional on county and year
fixed effects, as well as on last year’s yield; regressing current corn yield on the expected yield with no controls results
in a partial correlation coefficient of 0.97 in levels and 0.53 in logs. The results for soybeans are very similar.
These results show that current yield is predictive of future yield. For example, if last year’s yield was average, the
current yield is expected to be lower than average. Holding price and expected yields constant, this should increase
the demand for GRP insurance because the likelihood of a payout is higher. As I later show, this relationship is not
taken into account in prices, which means that adverse selection may arise. Specifically, if farmers know that this
year’s yield will be lower (higher) than expected, they should increase (decrease) their demand for insurance. Because
last year’s and current yields are negatively correlated, the relationship between the number of GRP policies and last
year’s yield should be positive if selection favors farmers and negative if it favors providers.
Table 3 shows the relationship between (a) the log of last year’s yield and the number of GRP policies and (b)
the log of this year’s yield and the number of GRP policies, controlling for the log of expected yield, county fixed
effects, and time fixed effects. The regression specification is a negative binomial. There is indeed some evidence
of adverse selection for corn - the relationship between last year’s corn yields and current takeup is positive and
marginally significant. There is no significant relationship between last year’s yield and the number of soybean area
yield policies, although the large standard errors make the estimate imprecise.
Table 3 also shows that current yields are positively correlated with insurance takeup for both corn and soybeans.
This suggests that, even though some adverse selection may be occurring, the net selection into GRP plans acts in
favor of insurers: In years when yields will be high (controlling for expected yield) more corn and soybean farmers
will take out county yield insurance.8
It is possible that equation (3) fails to control adequately for other changes that may be correlated with last year’s
yields. In particular, last year’s yields may affect the desirability of individual yield plans or individual revenue plans,
either through prices or payout probabilities. This does not matter for the validity of the test of selection into area
yield plans. However, in order to understand the behavior of market participants and whether selection might occur on
8Appendix B shows the results of an OLS regression of the log of GRP policies on current and past yields, controlling for expected yield and
fixed effects. In general, the results for corn are insignificant and those for soybeans are marginally significant. However, due to the count nature of
the data, a negative binomial specification is more appropriate.
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a more aggregate level, it is useful to look at the aggregate relationship between yields and takeup.
To see whether yield fluctuations are related to aggregate demand for insurance, I regress total insurance takeup
on last year’s yields and current yields, controlling for the expected yield. The results are shown in Table 4. Columns
1-3 show the results of an OLS regression of log policies on yields, while Columns 4-6 show the corresponding results
using a negative binomial specification. A 1% increase in last year’s yield is associated with a 0.11% decrease in
the total number of insurance policies for corn and a 0.08% decrease in policies for soybeans, while the relationships
between current yields and takeup are not significant. The same pattern holds for past yields and current yields in the
negative binomial specifications in Columns 3-6, although the coefficients are generally less significant.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I estimate the extent of selection in the US area yield insurance. I implement two tests of selection.
First, I use last year’s yield (which is predictive of the current yield but does not affect the price of a plan) as a potential
source of unpriced information on which farmers or providers could act. I find some evidence for adverse selection
based on this information for corn insurance plans, but not for soybeans, although the latter estimates are imprecise.
I then employ a more general test by estimating whether the current yield (which is realized after an insurance
purchase decision is made) is predictive of area yield insurance takeup. This is a valid test for selection in settings
where the insurance decision clearly precedes the outcome of interest and where moral hazard concerns are absent.
This reduced-form test indicates that area yield insurance takeup is higher when average current yields are higher. This
suggests that the net selection into area yield plans favors providers, not buyers of insurance.
The design of these plans precludes moral hazard, which enables me to attribute all estimated effects to selection.
Because the policy implications for moral hazard and selection are different, it is important to be able to distinguish
between the two effects. Moreover, farmers who adopt area yield insurance cannot exploit information about their
own idiosyncratic risk because that risk is irrelevant for payouts. This enables me to also cleanly test for selection
on aggregate risk. In other markets, selection on aggregate risk may be confounded by countervailing selection on
idiosyncratic risk or moral hazard, making the selection on aggregate unpriced information difficult to tease out.
In most insurance markets in which adverse selection is a potential problem, unobserved or unpriced information
is assumed to be better known by individuals. In the case of county yields, however, it is plausible that providers have
superior information. In particular, they may observe detailed current and past yield information for many farmers in
a county (through information needed to buy individual insurance plans, which are very popular) and are thus able to
form better aggregate yield forecasts than individual farmers are. However, providers of crop insurance are prohibited
from competing on prices. Thus, much of the competition focuses on who to sign up for a particular insurance plan and
when. Because crop insurance companies cannot compete on prices and many farmers buy insurance through agents,
agent-based competition might be very important in this market. Well-informed agents may be able to convince
farmers to choose one plan over another or target particular counties in years when yields there are likely to be high.
I also find that current and past yields are significant predictors of total insurance demand, including individual
plans. This suggests that the desirability of non-group insurance plans rises and falls with yields as well, suggesting
another mechanism through which the observed selection is occurring. However, because prices in these plans are
determined using individual yields, which I do not observe, I cannot determine whether the relationship between
aggregate takeup of insurance and yields is due to selection or changes in prices. Therefore, I cannot determine the
exact mechanism of selection with the current data. However, this is an important avenue of future research. If
providers of area yield or weather-based insurance are able to better predict outcomes than the individuals they insure
are and are able to use non-price mechanisms to increase takeup in years when insurance is least necessary, this lowers
the welfare gains from area yield or weather-based insurance.
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Plans similar to GRP have been advocated and implemented in developing nations because the enforcement costs
are much lower and the risk of moral hazard is completely eliminated, as long as the covered area is large enough so
that no farmer is able to affect the average county yield on his own. A variation on this approach that is common and
relevant is the use of rainfall as the determinant of payouts. One clear drawback of area yield or weather-based plans is
that they typically do not provide as much protection as plans based on individual yields provide. Another drawback,
as I have shown, is that selection remains a concern in these plans, potentially undermining their ability to provide
cheap insurance to farmers.
The generalizability of my results is subject to a key caveat: Area yield insurance or GRP makes up a small fraction
of insurance plans in the US. It is possible that selection would operate differently in a setting where only GRPs were
available. Although this is beyond the scope of this paper, it would be desirable to replicate this test using insurance
data from a developing country, where similar plans are often the only formal insurance available.
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7. Appendix A - Insurance Payments in Individual Plans
Because farmer productivity varies, individual baseline yields are necessary for individual-level plans to correctly
determine the basis on which payment should be made. The baseline yield for an individual yield plan is established
by averaging a farmer’s historic certified yields (four consecutive years is the minimum and 10 years is the maximum).
Once 10 years of continuous yield history is available, the baseline yield becomes a 10-year moving average, updated
every year. If less than four years of continuous yield history is available, average county yields are used in place of an
individual yield until the farmer builds up an adequate yield history. If county yields are used to calculate the baseline
yield, they are discounted by 15 − 35%, depending on how many years of actual yield history are available.
Per-acre payments under an individual yield plan (called Actual Production History or APH) are determined by
the following formula:
Pay_APHit = max(0,
[
Yield guaranteeit − Yieldit
] × price electioni) (7)
Yield guaranteeit = Xi ∗
1
10
10∑
s=1
Yieldi,t−s
where i indexes the farmer, t indexes the year, and Xi is the chosen coverage level. For individual yield plans, it ranges
from 50% to 85%, in increments of five percentage points. Price election is the payment per unit of yield shortfall,
chosen by the farmer from a range set by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) or the Risk Management
Agency (RMA). For example, a corn farmer with a yield guarantee of 148 bushels per acre, a 75% coverage level, and
a $1.50 price election will be paid $1.5 for every unit shortfall in yield below 111 bushels per acre.
The baseline for individual revenue insurance is also based on the farmer’s 4−10 year yield history but takes prices
into account as well. The baseline revenue is the average of the individual’s historic yields multiplied by the Chicago
Board of Trade pre-growing season futures prices for that crop.9 The actual revenue is calculated using the 1-month
futures price near the harvest time for that crop (called the "harvest futures price"):
Pay_RAit = max
(
0,Revenue guaranteeit − Revenueit
)
(8)
Revenue guaranteeit = Xi ∗ P (pre − season)t ∗
1
10
10∑
s=1
Yieldi,t−s
Revenueit = Yieldit ∗ P (harvest)t
9The exact month varies by crop.
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In some plans, farmers have the option to have the revenue guarantee based on the maximum of the February and
the harvest futures prices. This decreases the probability of a claim as well as the price of the insurance plan.
There are four types of individual revenue plans: Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), Income Protection (IP), Indexed
Income Protection (IIP), and Revenue Assurance (RA). The characteristics of all individual revenue plans are very
similar. The only difference between CRC and RA plans is that the former limit the amount of payment that is made
in case of a loss. The IP plan is similar to the CRC and RA plans, but with this plan it is not possible to base the
revenue guarantee on the harvest futures price. In addition, the IP requires that all cropland in a county that belongs to
the same entity and grows a particular crop be insured together. This is called an "enterprise unit." CRC and RA allow
the cropland to be divided into more basic units and insured separately. Starting in 2011, the four revenue protection
plans have been combined into two plans to eliminate redundancies.
The IIP plan is a variation of the IP plan that is based on individual yield histories relative to county yields. The
baseline yield is established by subtracting the average historic difference between individual and county yields from
the expected county yield, which is defined as the average county yield in the previous year. In other words, the yield
guarantee for year t is:
Xi ∗
Yieldc,t−1 − 110
10∑
s=1
Yieldc,t−s +
1
10
10∑
s=1
Yieldi,t−s

where Xi is again the coverage level chosen by the farmer.
The final category of insurance plans is group revenue insurance (Group Risk Income Protection or GRIP), which
pays farmers based on a combination of county yields and futures prices. As with the individual revenue plans,
prices in a county revenue plan are based on CBT futures prices for a given crop. County revenue plan payments are
determined as follows:
Pay_GRIPit = Revenue guaranteeict − Revenuect (9)
Revenue guaranteeict = Xi ∗ P (pre − season)t ∗
1
T
T+1∑
s=2
Ŷieldc,t−s
Revenuect = Yieldct ∗ P (harvest)t
8. Appendix B - Prices and Yields
In this section, I regress the prices of GRP crop insurance on last year’s yield, current yield, and expected yields.
The level of observation is county-year-coverage level. The coverage level ranges from 65% to 90% in increments of
five percentage points.
Table A1 shows the relationship between the price of GRP policies and last year’s yield, controlling for expected
yield. There is no statistically significant relationship between prices and last year’s yield. The expected yield is
negatively and significantly correlated with the price.
Table A2 shows the relationship between the price of GRP policies and this year’s yield, controlling for expected
yield. Again, there is no statistically significant relationship between the current yield and the price. Moreover, the
high R-squared suggests that the variables included in the regression capture nearly all the relevant variation in prices.
In Table A3, I show OLS regressions corresponding to Table 3. Although high yields last year are strongly
predictive of lower yields this year, there is no significant relationship between last year’s yields and the number of
currently held policies (although the estimate is not very precise). Current yields are also not significant predictors of
the total takeup. For both current and past yields, the sign of the estimated coefficient is the opposite of what would be
predicted by theory. Changing the dependent variable to Log (Policieslt + 1) to take into account observations in which
no GRP policies are purchased does not change the results qualitatively, although it does increase their precision.
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